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This dissertation looks at several issues in designing an optimal skill-based 
consumer contest (SBCC). Consumer product (or service) companies, such as 
online entertainment providers, often use SBCCs to promote the consumption of 
their products (or services). The main objective of a SBCC is to maximize the 
profit from the enhanced consumption by consumers rather than their outcome in 
the contest. This research is the first to investigate design issues in contests of this 
kind. 
The first part of the dissertation explores the role of SBCCs in online 
entertainment area by focusing on the status-seeking behavior of human beings. 
Drawing from psychology literature, I argue that the desire for status provides a 
vii
strong motive for consumers to compete with each other in online entertainment 
communities. 
In the second part of the dissertation, I build a game-theoretical model to 
study a handful of design issues arising from the SBCCs. In this framework, a 
monopoly firm faces n consumers who may differ in skill levels. The firm offers a 
set of prizes to consumers in a SBCC that requires two inputs: skill and 
consumption. One of the main findings in this research is that a Winner-Take-All 
prize structure is often optimal (but not always) for the SBCCs. Another finding is 
that consumers will compete more aggressively when their skill levels are closer 
to each other. As a result, the firm may be better off by segmenting consumers 
based on their skill levels. In addition, in some cases, the firm is better off by 
charging an entry fee to exclude low-skilled consumers. These findings contribute 
to existing literature on contest designs and provide practical guidelines for 
structuring a SBCC. 
The last part of the dissertation empirically analyzes two individual-level 
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Introduction
In last few years, the focus of the entertainment industry is shifting away 
from delivering products and services to nurturing users’ experience within a 
network of online communities. In this new networked computing environment, 
active participation of users and interactions among them become critical part of 
the experience-creation process. This dissertation explores how companies can 
take advantage of this technology-enabled community environment by organizing 
skill-based consumer contests (SBCCs) to increase the aggregate usage of online 
entertainment services.
This dissertation contains three essays arranged in chapter order. The first 
essay is based on my prior work on a book chapter titled “Status Seeking and the 
Design of Online Entertainment Communities”. The book chapter is forthcoming 
in Karmarkar and Apte eds. (2004) “Managing in the Information Economy: 
Current Research Issues”. In this essay we overview the recent development of 
the online entertainment industry and develop an understanding how SBCCs 
could enhance entertainment companies’ profits. One implication is that like other 
social environments, users in online entertainment communities have a natural 
tendency of pursuing status among their peers. Another implication is that status-
seeking activities, if properly aligned with entertainment companies’ objective, 
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can increase the aggregate usage of online entertainment services and therefore 
enhance the companies’ profitability.  
The second essay is based on a research paper being revised for Marketing 
Science. This essay develops insights on how to optimally structure SBCCs in 
online entertainment communities. We model status seeking as a SBCC played by 
n  users. A user’s performance in SBCCs is jointly determined by her inherent 
skill and the level of usage she chooses. The company chooses the prize structure 
and the contest structure to maximize the aggregate usage of all users. One of the 
main findings is that the optimal prize structure is either Winner-Take-All or 
Split-Prize (i.e. equally splitting the prize sum among first j  winners). Winner-
Take-All is often optimal, especially when the number of users is large. A second 
finding is that the company is worse off by segmenting users based on non-skill 
factors such as geographical regions. However, it may be better off by segmenting 
users based on their skill levels. We also show that the company is better off by 
running a SBCC that has higher marginal substitution of usage for skill. Finally, 
under some circumstances, the company should charge an entry fee to exclude 
low-skilled users. These results offer important theoretical guidance for the 
designers of SBCCs. This research is the first to study the design of contests with 
an objective of maximizing aggregate input of all participants. 
The third essay employs empirical analysis to achieve two objectives: 1) 
to detect status-seeking behavior in online entertainment communities and 2) to 
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test whether the displayed playing behavior is consistent with the equilibrium 
prediction. We have collected two datasets for a mobile game. We conduct a logit 
regression on the stop event (a stop event happens if the next game time is more 
than one hour later). We find that users displays a “stopping rule” behavior, i.e. 
the probability of stop increases after obtaining a high score, which indicates the 
possibility of status-seeking.  
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Chapter 1. Status Seeking and Its Implications for the 
Design of Online Entertainment Communities
1.1 Introduction
“The online experience, the ability to create virtual communities online, is 
going to be a much bigger part of the industry going forward.” 
-- Robbie Bach, Microsoft Xbox Chief Officer
The development of new information and communication technologies has 
initiated a radical transformation in the entertainment industry, characterized by 
the decline of passive entertainment and the rise of the interactive online 
entertainment. The traditional model of selling packaged content to customers met 
serious challenges from disruptive technologies. Amid the proliferation of the 
digital music and the peer-to-peer file sharing on the Internet, global music sales 
has dropped by 5% in 2001, then 7% in 2002 (BBC News 2003). The television 
industry is also suffering accelerating loss of audience, partially attributable to the 
digital video recorder technology, such as TiVo, which enables users to record 
shows and playback on their own time, often without commercials. According to 
a recent report (Nelson and Peers 2003), young adult viewers of prime-time 
television have dropped sharply by 7% last year. 
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The new interactive online entertainment, represented by electronic 
gaming has enjoyed high growth rates for the past decade despite the technology 
slump. The 2002 sales for game software, hardware and accessories increased by 
8% to reach $10.3 billion, surpassing Hollywood record box-office sales of $9.27 
billion (Black 2003). The top sports game title, Madden NFL 2004 by Electronic 
Arts, reaped $200 million in sales and attracted more eyeball hours than HBO’s 
hit show The Sopranos. 
Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) is one new and fast-
growing segment of online entertainment. MMOGs are originated from text-based 
multi-user dungeons (MUD) in late 70’s. The first true MMOG, Ultima Online, 
was launched in 1997 and has since built a subscriber base of about 250,000 
players. The global market for MMOGs is expected to reach $2.7 billion in 
revenue by 2006 (Staehlin 2003). 
MMOGs usually allow thousands of players to inhabit and adventure in a 
virtual game world at the same time. A long-standing success in MMOG history 
in United States is EverQuest®. Each player in EverQuest starts by choosing a 
game character, called an avatar, from a handful of races. Avatars can have their 
own appearance, skills, professions, and social connections. Players can maneuver 
their avatars to perform a variety of activities, such as exploring lands, managing 
assets, taking on monsters or foes, and making friends. Since launched in 1999, 
EverQuest has amassed 500,000 subscribers. A major attraction of EverQuest and 
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other MMOGs lies in the ability for players to live in an alternate reality – while 
the world and avatars only exist in bytes, players’ experience are real.
Figure 1. An EverQuest Screenshot
Another expanding area of online entertainment is mobile gaming. Mobile 
games utilize wireless data technologies, such as SMS (short messages) or WAP, 
to enable real-time interaction between users and servers and among users. The 
idea of using wireless gaming to accelerating wireless data usage has gained a lot 
of attention among telecom companies. By 2002, mobile gaming had become the 
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top wireless data traffic in Europe. The global mobile game industry is estimated 
to generate $12.8 billion in revenue by 2008 (Frost & Sullivan Report 2002).
Mobile Millionaire is an example of successful mobile games in early 
days. The game is based on the popular TV show “Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire.” Players of Mobile Millionaire answer trivia questions stored on a 
game server. The game is designed such that players can retrieve and answer 
trivia questions using their mobile phone through the SMS, WAP, and etc. Users 
are billed according to the number of messages or actual number of data packets. 
In some cases, users also need to pay a premium fee for playing a game title. The 
following figure illustrates a SMS version of Mobile Millionaire game. 
Figure 2.  Mobile Millionaire
Simple in its design, Mobile Millionaire is played by millions of users 
around the world. Mobile Millionaire is more often played in a social context: a 
group of friends gather to start a race to high scores each on their own cell phones.
Both MMOGs and mobile games embrace the idea of interaction among a 
community of users. Such an idea also took off among the traditional console 
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segment. In 2002, all the Big Three game console makers, i.e. Sony, Nintendo,
and Microsoft, have supplemented their game consoles with Internet connections. 
This move was heartily welcomed by players: according to an analyst in 
GartnerG2, in just three months some 400,000 gamers have adapted their game 
consoles for playing online (Lewis 2003). Microsoft has recently launched the 
Xbox Sports Network, which allows Xbox users to connect to the Xbox Live 
service to take on each other in an virtual tournament. Microsoft contended that 
the creation of online communities instead of content will become the biggest part 
of the industry.
These trends reflect that the focus of the entertainment industry is shifting 
away from delivering products and services to nurturing user’s online experience. 
In new online entertainment, the entertainment companies are no longer sole 
producers of entertainment value. Rather, in the words of Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy (2003) in their award winning article, “individual customers actively 
co-construct their own consumption experiences through personalized interaction, 
thereby co-creating unique value for themselves”. 
Given the crucial role of online communities in online entertainment, it is 
imperative to understand how entertainment companies can use online 
communities to nurture users’ experiences. In this dissertation, we focus on the 
status seeking behavior and its implications for the design of online entertainment 
communities. 
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1.2 Status Seeking in Online Entertainment Communities 
Status and the pursuit of it is one of the main themes in online 
entertainment communities.  For example, an avatar in EverQuest with 50+ levels 
is considered as a celebrity in the virtual world. Players often show off their status 
through their equipment and their levels of achievement. Mobile Millionaire 
features a monthly hall of fame to recognize best-performed players of the month. 
Sometimes it also gives cash prizes and/or cell phones to the winners. The 
following figure shows an example of a hall of fame used by Virgin Mobile 
Telecom.
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Figure 3. The hall of fame for Mobile Millionaire
In this dissertation, we try to explore the role of status seeking in online 
entertainment communities and to study how companies can influence status 
seeking to increase the aggregate usage of online entertainment service. 
This research is important for three reasons. First, the value of status is an 
important value provided by online entertainment communities. From gamers 
craving for halls of fame to racing to higher levels in MMOGs, it is impressive 
how concerned people are with their status in online entertainment communities.  
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Second, this research is particularly important because of the unparalleled 
opportunities for entertainment companies to influence status seeking. In online 
entertainment communities, not only providers can choose what status criteria to 
use and what the status symbols look like but also they can decide on what are 
legitimate status-seeking activities and who will compete with whom. Many 
online entertainment providers have introduced halls of fame, rankings, 
tournaments and ladders to induce status seeking. However, there are few 
theoretical guidelines on what is the most effective design of these instruments. 
Finally, the advantages of doing research in this area lie in the uniqueness 
of online entertainment industry as a source of data on user behavior and as a field 
for experimenting on different designs. Due to the digitalized nature of online 
entertainment communities, it is often easier to collect information on user 
behavior and manipulate design features.  
1.3 Why Do Users Seek Status In Online Entertainment 
Communities?
In sociology literature, status refers to one’s relative standing in a social 
hierarchy as determined by respect, deference and social influence (Ridgeway and 
Walker 1995). The desire of status is one of the basic needs of human being 
(Moslow 1968, 1971). Csikszentmihalyi (2000) wrote that the need for status and 
self-esteem in general, “is presumably active even when the lower-order needs are 
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not entirely met” and “becomes fully active after survival, safety, and 
belongingness needs are more or less taken care of.” Studies by sociologists 
showed that status seeking is pervasive in virtually all societies (Ball et al. 2001).
Many researchers in sociology view status as a means to obtain resources 
(Lin 1990, 1994) or power (Thye 2000). Thus, status is pursued as a “rational” 
tool. In line with this view, Ball and his colleagues found in experimental settings 
that individuals with higher status were conceded higher benefits in negotiations 
(Ball and Eckel 1996) and markets exchange (Ball et al. 2001). This view is 
consistent with the fact that many social and economic resources, such as tenure 
positions and salesperson’s compensation, are allocated based on relative rankings. 
Another view holds that status is not only a means to an end but also an 
(emotional) end in itself. Evolutionary anthropologists have identified status 
seeking as an ancient emotional tendency in primates (Barkow 1975). Biological 
experiments on monkeys connected the gaining of status to high blood serotonin 
levels (blood serotonin level is associated with pleasure) (McGuire & Raleigh 
1985). Therefore, people may pursue status for emotional reasons rather than 
external benefits. In a recent study, Loch et al. (2003) showed that people valued 
status even when status was nothing but applause from audience. Indeed, in online 
gaming examples, people show interests in pursuing a hall of fame or rankings, 
even without prizes or other immediate extrinsic rewards. 
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In online entertainment communities, both views may be plausible. On the 
one hand, status in online entertainment communities is often a symbol of 
competence. Therefore, users may pursue it as an emotional end in itself. On the 
other hand, status in online entertainment communities may also lead to physical 
resources (such as prizes in Mobile Millionaire) or virtual resources (such as a 




Figure 4. the value of status
1.4 The Business Value of Status Seeking
The value of status seeking in online entertainment communities lies in its 
incentive power: the desire for status can motivate users to take actions to gain 
status, which may induce a higher level of usage. We call these status-building 
actions as status-seeking activities. Status-seeking activities can overlap with the 
1 It is also worth noting, that some game players sell their avatars in EverQuest through EBay 
(although Sony banned this). In such a case, a user may pursue a status for its trade value.
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normal usage activities. For instance, in Mobile Millionaire some users are 
willing to play more games just for entering the hall of fame. To mobile network 
operators, it means more revenue from such users. 
Status seeking activities may become a regenerative source of revenue. 
Whenever other users raise their bid for status, one has to keep up by putting in 
more effort to maintain her status. In contrast, entertainment content will never 
regenerate its value once exhausted. When entertainment content is very costly to 
produce, status seeking can be an invaluable to online entertainment companies. 
Status seeking may explain why MMOGs have much longer life span (EverQuest 
has been around for almost 5 years) than their PC counterparts (many exist for no 
longer than a year). Some players surprised themselves when they came back to 
the same MMOG after a half year and saw almost a whole new world.
Status-seeking activities can also be intrinsically valuable to users. Just as 
playing a Mobile Millionaire can be fun while it is status-building. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975) show that the use of skills itself can be a source of
enjoyment. In this case, status-building has to be a part of what an online 
entertainment service has to offer. 
Of course, status seeking activities may bear some costs to users. By 
pursuing status, users have to spend time, effort, and/or monetary payment (e.g. 
the data packet fee one has to pay in Mobile Millionaire case). How much a users 
is willing to pursue status depends on the tradeoff between the intrinsic fun of 
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status seeking activities and the cost of it, on the worth of status, and on 
individual traits (such as whether the user is an achiever-type or an explorer-type).
In summary, users’ value from status seeking activities comes from the 
value of status and from their intrinsic value toward status seeking activities. The 
amount of status seeking activities should increase in the users’ valuation for 
status and in users’ intrinsic value towards status seeking activities.  The amount 
of status seeking activities should decrease in the cost of conducting such 
activities. 
The company can potentially capture users’ value in status seeking 
activities, such as through usage fee, although it may not always be able to do so. 
For instance, one of the controversial issues in massively multiplayer online 
gaming is macroing, i.e. using macros to simulate keyboard and mouse 
movements so that one can collect game credits without playing in person. While 
macroing enhances one’s status (assuming macroing can not be detected or 
punished), it reduces the player’s lifetime with the game and so eventually 
undermines the online entertainment provider’s profits. 
Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between status, status seeking 











Figure 5. The value of status seeking in online entertainment
communities 
The notion of status-seeking activities is similar to that of “positional 
goods” due to economist Robert Frank (1985). Houses and cars are positional 
goods because they not only generate consumption utility but also a positional 
utility, i.e. demonstrating one’s status. Frank showed that when people are 
concerned about relative positions, they tended to over-spend on positional goods. 
By this argument, when users are concerned about their status in online 
entertainment communities, they also tend to spend more on entertainment. 
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1.5 A Game-Theoretic Framework for Studying Status Seeking
Status seeking in online entertainment communities is analogous to the 
race by the business schools to get a good ranking, except that prizes for business 
school rankings are high-quality students (Schatz 1993) and the prizes for high-
ranking in online games are more of psychological rewards. Status seeking falls 
into the generalized notion of contests in economics literature, which 
encompasses various economic and social activities such as rent seeking, patent 
racing, R&D tournaments, salesperson competition, and so on. A common 
element of these different activities is that the allocation of the resources –
monopoly rents, patent, prizes, funding and student quality – are based on the 
relative performance of participating parties. To put it in economic terms, 
“contests are situations where agents spend resources to compete for one or more 
prizes” (Moldovanu and Sela 2001).
We also adopt a game-theoretic approach to study status-seeking contests. 
A status-seeking contest is viewed as a game played by individual users, where 
usage is their investment and the status is their prize. Game-theoretic approach is 
widely adopted in economic literature in studying contests. For instance, in the 
seminal work by Lazear and Rosen (1981), contests are formulated as a 
competition among agents each of whom invest unobservable amount of effort to 
produce an output valued by a principal. The game-theoretic approach enables us 
18
to obtain theoretical insights on how design variables, such as prize allocation and 
the segmentation of the population, can affect the profits of online entertainment 
providers. 
We start with a somewhat general framework that accommodates different 
specifications of status seeking contests. We present its use in next section with 
further specifications on model assumptions. It is useful to start with describing 
the key variables captured in the generalized model.
● Usage. We assume the main status -seeking activity in online 
entertainment communities is using the service provided by the online 
entertainment provider, denoted by the variable usage (measured in hours). Usage 
plays three roles in our context. First of all, the usage of the service provides 
intrinsic value of entertainment to users. Second, it costs users money in the form 
of payment made to the online entertainment providers. Third and importantly, 
usage (and ability) improves one’s performance therefore helps one to gain status.
● Ability. Ability reflects users’ talent or skills. In our framework, one’s 
performance is not only affected by usage levels but also by her ability. 
Heterogeneity in user ability levels is virtually inevitable in online entertainment 
communities. Such heterogeneity may arise either because users are different in 
their talents per se (e.g. the eye-hand coordination skill or the acccurary of recall) 
or because they have gained different levels of experience. Because most status-
seeking contests in online communities are skill-based, we preserve the ability 
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factor as an important variable in our framework. Note that skill-based contests 
are different from games of luck, such as lotteries or sweepstakes. In the latter 
case, only the number of entries (corresponding to usage) affects one’s chance of 
winning. 
Following conventions in the economic literature, we assume that ability 
is private information, i.e. each user knows her own ability2, but does not know 
others’. This assumption is consistent with the fact that in online communities it is 
more difficult to assess others’ true ability, given that individuals can so easily 
hide behind their IDs or avatars. We assume ability factors are drawn from a 
common distribution, referred to as the ability distribution, and this distribution is 
common knowledge to all the users and the online entertainment provider. In 
reality, users may gain such knowledge from their previous observations or 
indirectly from their peers. Note that the ability distribution is ex ante knowledge 
and the realized ability profiles of the population are not known to the user. 
● Random factor. Sometimes to win a status seeking game, one needs not 
only usage and ability but also a bit of “luck”. We model such luck as the random 
factor in a user’s performance. Note that the magnitude of the randomness can 
2 However, the assumption that users know their own ability may be questionable because some 
studies suggest individuals may misjudge their own abilities or lack of knowledge about 
themselves (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). More research is needed to account for these 
considerations.
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sometimes be controlled by the designers of online communities, e.g. by 
introducing randomness in the outcome of a fight with monsters. 
We consider there are n potential users of the online entertainment 
service, indexed by ni ...1= . A user’s performance ( ix ) is affected by her usage
( it ), ability ( iµ ), and a random factor ( iε ). We let the performance function be 
( )iii ,ε,µtf . f increases in all three arguments. We assume each ability parameter 
is an independent draw from a common distribution F  and each random factor in 
performance is an independent draw from a common distribution G . We assume 
that GF ,  and n are known by all the users and the online entertainment provider 
(note that actually number of participating users may be less than n ).
Status is allocated according to rank-order performance of participating 
users. We also call status as a prize due to their common nature. All users agree 
upon the value of status. Denote the value of ranking the first as 1v , the value of 
ranking the second as 2v , and so on ( nvvv ≥≥≥ ...21 ). We denote the status 
vector as [ ]nvvv ,..., 21=v . 
A user’s overall utility consists of the utility from winning a status, the 
intrinsic utility of using the online entertainment service, and the disutility of 
payment to the online entertainment provider.  Let [ ]iniii ρρρ ,..., 21=ρ  denote the 
user i's probability of being jth in the contest, given her ability iµ  and her usage it . 
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ρ . We assume her intrinsic utility from 
usage is ii t⋅θ  and her payment to the online entertainment provider is itp ⋅ . The 




jijiii tptvtU θρ +−= ∑
=1
, ρ
Note that not only iρ  is affected by ix  (hence iiit εµ and, ) it is also 
affected by ( )ijx j ≠  (hence jµ , jjt εand, ). But since a user does not know 
others’ ability parameters or their choice of usage level, she can form an 
estimation of others’ performance based on her knowledge about common 
distribution GF and  as well as her belief about others strategy discussed below.
A user’s strategy is defined as a mapping from her ability parameter to her 
choice of usage level, denoted as ( )iit µ . A strategy profile of all users forms a 
Nash equilibrium if it satisfies an incentive compatibility (IC) condition, which 
requires that she does not want to deviate from her strategy given other users’ 
strategy, and an individual rationality (IR) condition, which requires that her 
expected utility of participating in the contest is non-negative.
We assume the marginal cost of providing online entertainment service is 
a constant, which we can normalize to zero without loss of generality. In addition, 
the online entertainment provider also incurs a fixed fee for organizing the contest 
denoted as K . K  may include the cost for prizes, hiring judges, advertising fee, 
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etc. Since K  is sunk cost, we can drop K  from consideration in the provider’s 
profit function without affecting the study of the design issues. 
We assume online entertainment charges a fixed subscription fee ep  and a 
usage fee p  for using online entertainment service. When 0=ep , the online 
entertainment provider purely replies upon usage fee for profits. When 0=p , the 
online entertainment provider only charges a subscription fee and usage is free of 
charge. In the former case, the online entertainment provider maximizes the 
aggregate usage of all users. In the latter case, the online entertainment provider 
maximizes the number of users who participate in online entertainment 
communities. An intermediate case is that the online entertainment provider 
charges a subscription fee plus a certain usage fee. All three cases are seen in real 
world applications. 
















Note that at the time of designing the online entertainment community, the 
online entertainment provider does not know the exact ability parameters of users. 
As a result, ii tandδ , which depends on iµ , can be treated as random variables
from the online entertainment provider’s point of view.
23
This framework captures the main feature of status seeking in online 
entertainment communities. First, it reflects that the usage of an online 
entertainment service not only generates the value of entertainment, but also gives 
rise to the value of status. Second, it captures the fact that users differ in ability, 
which can explain the variation in the level of status-seeking activities. Third and 
importantly, the design objective of the online entertainment communities is to 
maximize the total “input” of all users rather than their “outcome”. 
1.6 Implications of status seeking for the design of online 
entertainment communities
Although striving for status is “built into us”, the value of status and the 
rules of status seeking to some extent are selectable by the companies (Barkow 
1989). The possibility of shaping status seeking is the most important premise for 
this research. Such a possibility is higher in online communities than in off-line 
communities because companies who organize online communities can 
manipulate them more easily. In general, design issues associated with status 
seeking may include the following.
Manipulating the value of status. Although different users may valuate 
status differently, the companies still have plenty of room to manipulate the value 
of status. According to our previous discussion, companies can enhance the value 
of status by increasing the emotional value attached to the status (e.g. giving 
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special recognition) or by increasing the resource associated with status (e.g. 
giving monetary prizes, in-game credits, or privileges). Were prizes given, 
companies need to decide on the number and size of prizes. Even if no prizes 
given, companies need to consider the number of users who will receive status 
recognition. 
Rules for status seeking. Although users may decide for themselves what 
is worth seeking and how to seek, companies can certainly influence what is 
considered as encouraged status and status-seeking behavior in online 
entertainment communities. This could be done by accounting for users’ 
performance one way or another and by allowing or banning certain kinds of 
activities. Particularly in online gaming, a level system is crucial part of rules for 
status seeking. The company can also choose the information transparency in 
online entertainment communities: to what extent a user should know about her 
peers’ skill levels?  Finally, the company can also influence the uncertainty in 
users’ performance. For example, the company can adjust the game parameters to 
make the probability of winning a battle with a monster depend more on luck. 
Managing the population. Should the company segment users into 
groups or levels? How does the company decide on the size of each group? 
Should the company allow users to participate in a certain status-seeking 
challenge? These design issues can potentially affect the health of an online 
entertainment community.
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Of course, the above list is much longer than we can possibly address in 
this dissertation. In chapter two, we will examine some of the important design 
issues in a specific framework, including the prize structure, segmentation, choice 
of performance measures and entry fee. 
We have chosen to examine the above design issues using a skill-based 
contest model.  Because status is awarded on a relative base, the game of status 
seeking falls into the notion of contests in economics literature, which 
encompasses rent seeking, patent racing, R&D tournaments, salesperson 
competition and so on. A common element of these different contests is that the 
allocation of “prizes” is based on the relative performance of participating parties. 
To put it in economic terms, “contests are situations where agents spend resources 
to compete for one or more prizes” (Moldovanu and Sela 2001). 
The game-theoretic approach enables us to characterize users’ choice of 
the level of status seeking activities. On top of that, we are able to analyze how 
the design variables, such as prize allocation and the segmentation of the 
population, can affect the profits of online entertainment providers. 
1.7 Beyond Online Entertainment Communities
Status seeking is not exclusive to online entertainment communities. In 
fact, status seeking virtually exists in all online communities. Here are a few 
examples.
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● Peer-to-peer customer support communities. A rationale behind peer-
to-peer support is that customers can be effective contributors of knowledge in 
online communities, provided with appropriate incentives. Peer- and self-
supports redirect part of the huge burden of customer support to customers 
themselves and are therefore expected to save costs. Rewards and token 
recognitions based on certain rankings are among the commonly used strategies 
by community providers (Gu and Sirkka 2003). For example, Hewlett Packard 
(HP) operates 35 discussion boards for novices and (internal or external) experts 
to share their knowledge, information and to encourage learning. The following 
figure shows HP ranks members by the number of answers posted and uses the 
“hall of fame” to recognize frequent contributors. 
Figure 6. The rankings of contributors in HP’s customer community.
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● Customer-supplied reviews. Customer reviews are crucial for online 
retailers such as Amazon.com. It provides important third-party information on 
quality about products and services and thus increases buyers’ confidence in 
making purchase decisions. Given the voluntary and neutral-grounded nature of 
customer reviewers, monetary incentives are inappropriate for such a setting. 
Non-monetary recognitions serve as an exclusive tool for rewarding customers. 
Anecdotal stories on newspapers suggested that a little token saying “top-500 
reviewers” or “top-100 reviewers” provide a powerful (emotional) status reward 
to those volunteer customer reviewers. The following picture illustrates the 
recognitions of top-ranked customer reviewers at Amazon.com. 
Figure 7. Amazon’s top reviewers
One thing remains common among these examples: status becomes 
meaningful to users when it conveys signals about one’s skill. What is likely 
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different in above-mention online communities is the way status seeking activities 
tied to the company’s objectives. In online entertainment communities, the 
company only cares about usage (input); a user’s performance (output) is 
valueless to the company. However, in consumer reviewer communities or peer-
to-peer support communities, the company may care as much the quantity of user 
postings (input) as the quality of them (output). In addition, the nature of 
interaction among users in above two examples is also different from that of 
online entertainment communities.
Despite these differences, the notion of status seeking as well as the game-
theoretic framework we are going to study are applicable to these online 
communities as well. Results we obtain in the following chapter may be applied 
to these online communities with some modifications.  
To conclude, we identify status seeking to play a role in online 
entertainment communities. Status seeking as potential driver for usage provides 
value to online entertainment companies. We discuss the opportunities for the 
company to influence status seeking, which give rise to the importance of the 
research in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2. The Optimal Design of Skill-Based Consumer 
Contests
2.1 Research Questions and Motivation
In this chapter we study the optimal design of a SBCC. Three major 
characteristics of a SBCC make the study of it unique in the sales promotion 
literature. First, unlike price-cut or coupon-based sales promotion that rewards a 
consumer based on her absolute usage level, a SBCC considers her relative 
performance with respect to other users. Second, in a SBCC users are 
differentiated by skill levels, thus a company is often concerned about how users’ 
usage pattern is affected by their level of skill. Third and most strikingly, while 
prior research on various types of contests focuses on optimizing some measure of 
output, such as the total sales volume of all dealers in a salesperson contest, in a 
SBCC the company tries to maximize the total input to the contest – namely the 
total usage by all users. 
In this chapter we study the following two sets of questions, all centering 
around the objective of maximizing total usage of the service. The first set of 
questions is on prize structure, including how many prizes should be offered, and 
how the total award should be allocated among all prizes. The second set is on 
contest structure, including whether and how to segment the user population, how 
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to set the admission policy, and whether to handicap high-skilled users. The 
relevance of these questions to business practice is evident from the fact that, with 
a scarce of theoretical guidance, many businesses are now actively experimenting 
with various prize and contest structures. For example, Mobile Millionaire offers 
one grand prize of $26,260 in one country and 10 prizes in another country, 
ranging from $1,138 to $23. Our personal interactions with industry professionals 
also reveal that experimenting is usually slow, costly, and often do not generate 
enough knowledge for improving the design of SBCCs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we 
review related literature. Section 2.3 sets forth our model. In section 2.4 and 2.5, 
we analyze the optimal prize structure problem and contest structure problem 
respectively. Section 2.6 discusses some extensions of the model.
2.2 Related Literature
The use of skill-based user contests as a promotion vehicle is mentioned in 
most popular marketing texts. Consumer contests, sweepstakes, games are 
collectively called prize promotions. The difference between sweepstakes and 
SBCCs is mainly that sweepstakes are “game of luck” while SBCCs are “game of 
skill”. The different between games and SBCCs is that games do not reward users 
on a relative performance basis. Despite its wide use, SBCCs have received little 
academic attention in the sales promotion literature with the exception of Ward 
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and Hill (1991). Ward and Hill took a cognitive and social psychology 
perspective to the design of SBCCs, which contrasts with the economics 
perspective presented in this research. Few consultants or journalists have written 
on the design of SBCCs (e.g. Feinman et al 1986 and Howard 1988). 
Our research is related to three bodies of literature on contests: relative 
compensation literature, R&D tournaments literature, and rent-seeking literature. 
Relative compensation (some times called tournaments or contests) is often used 
in compensating fund managers and sales representatives. Since the original paper 
by Lazear and Rosen (1981), relative compensation scheme has received 
considerable attention in economics (e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983), marketing 
(e.g. Basu et al 1985) and finance (e.g. Brown et al 2001) literature. A majority of 
papers in this literature focus on comparing relative compensation with 
commonly-used piece-rate compensation. A few recent papers, including Kalra 
and Shi (2001) and Krishna and Morgan (1998), took the relative compensation 
scheme as given and studied the design of it. However, relative compensation 
literature usually assumes maximizing aggregate output. Therefore, their results 
are not directly applicable to the online entertainment context. 
R&D tournaments (also called research contests) are frequently used by 
governments or other public sectors to nurture innovation. Select the best
innovation is a distinctive objective of R&D tournaments. A major design issue 
studied in R&D tournaments literature is the issue of entry policy. Taylor (1995) 
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studied the number of candidates. Fullerton and McAfee (1999) proposed using 
auctions to screen candidates. The prize structure is not an issue in this literature 
since there is normally one winner. 
Tullock (1981) originated the rent-seeking literature by modeling rent-
seeking activities (e.g. lobbying for monopoly rights) as all-pay auctions. A major 
distinction between all-pay auctions and winner-pay auctions is that in all-pay 
auctions, the bids are not refundable independent of winning. The main concern in 
this literature is whether the aggregate expenditure exceeds the total rent to be 
allocated. The rent-seeking literature is joint by auction theorists. The most recent 
development on the all-pay auction approach to contests includes Moldovanu and 
Sela (2001, 2002) and Che and Gale (2000, 2003). Our model of SBCCs also 
adopts the all-pay auction approach to contests. 
Krishna and Morgan (1998) and Kalra and Shi (2001) studied the issue of 
optimal prize structure in the context of employee compensation. Krishna and 
Morgan (1998) show that when employees are risk-neutral, winner-take-all is 
optimal; winner-take-all is also optimal in two-player or three-player contests, 
regardless of employees’ risk-attitude and the distribution of the output. Kalra and 
Shi (2001) analyzed the optimal prize structure in a multiple-player context. They 
showed that when sales follow uniform distribution, the winner-take-all is optimal 
regardless of the number of salespersons, their risk attitude, and the degree of 
uncertainty; however, if sales follow logistic distribution multiple prizes should 
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be awarded and the optimal number of prizes increases and the optimal inter-prize 
spread decreases with the degree of risk aversion. Both papers have assumed 
identical employees. 
Singh and Wittman (1998) studied the issue of prize structure with 
heterogonous contestants. They modeled both heterogeneous skills and stochastic 
performance, whereas in this research we assume deterministic performance. 
Their model assumed only two players therefore is not suitable for studying 
SBCCs. With uniformly distributed skill, they showed that the optimal prize is the 
highest when the designer maximizes the winner’s performance, the second 
highest when the designer maximizes average performance and the lowest when 
the designer maximizes loser’s performance3. 
Glazer and Hassin (1988) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001) are closest to 
this research. They studied the issue of optimal prize structure in a similar 
framework as this research but with different design objectives. In particular, both 
papers assume the designer maximizes aggregate output of the contestants. Glazer 
and Hassin (1998) showed that Winner-Take-All is optimal under uniformly-
distributed skills and linear cost functions. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) 
generalized Glazer and Hassin (1998)’s Winner-Take-All result to general 
3 In their paper, the three design objectives correspond to patent race, salespersons contests, and 
sports contest respectively.  
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distributions. They showed that if the cost function is linear or concave, winner-
take-all is optimal regardless of the distribution of abilities and the number of 
players. As we show later, their results do not carry over to SBCCs in general. 
Also, because the optimal prize structure obtained in their settings is an extreme 
Winner-Take-All structure, they didn’t offer insights on how factors such as skill 
distribution and contest size affect the number and allocation of prizes. 
Optimal entry policy has been studied in the R&D tournament literature. 
Taylor (1995) showed that open entry is generally not optimal even if the cost of 
running contests is zero. They argued that with too many participants, contestants
are discouraged from spending effort because each of them has a smaller chance 
to win. Fullerton and McAfee (1999) showed that it is often optimal to allow just 
two lowest-cost firms to participate. Clearly, the two-is-optimal result may not 
apply in SBCCs due to different design objectives. 
The segmentation issue is recently studied by Moldovanu and Sela (2002). 
They compared a grand contest with k parallel contests with the equally-split 
prizes. They found that when the contestants’ cost functions are linear or concave, 
the aggregate output of a grand contest dominates that of k parallel contests. Their 
result contrasts with our horizontal segmentation results – in our setting a grand 
contest dominates k  parallel contests only under certain conditions. 
The concept of handicapping in this research is different from those 
studied in prior literature. Lazear and Rosen (1981) studied a handicapping 
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system which gives high-skilled employee a harder start. Feess et al (2003) and 
Clark and Riis (2000) studied a similar handicapping system in the context of 
rent-seeking games, in which the rule of allocation is in favor of one bidder 
against the other (e.g. between a local bidder an international bidder). Both 
approaches require information on type of contestants and impose “unfair” rules 
based on observed types. In our research, however, the contest designer can 
handicap high-skilled users by implementing a performance function that has 
higher marginal rate of substitution of usage for skill. The handicapping approach 
presented in this research is based on “fair rules” and can be implemented without 
the knowledge of actual skills. 
2.3 A Game-theoretic Model of Skill-Based Contests
We consider a company which sells a single service  to n  users indexed 
by ni ,...,2,1= (we will drop the subscription i whenever we talk about any one 
user). In order to promote its service, the company organizes a one-time SBCC
among the n  users. So each of the n  users is a potential participant of the SBCC.
The SBCC is tied to the service in the way that the amount of the service
consumed by the user (hereafter usage) will enhance a user's performance in the 
SBCC. A certain skill factor also affects a user's performance in the SBCC. The 
skill factor could be writing skill in a short essay contest or photography skill in a 
photo contest. We consider the skill factor as one-dimensional. 
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We assume a user's performance ( x  ) depends on her usage ( t  ) and skill 
( µ ) in a function form ( )tX ,µ  , which we call the performance function. In 
particular, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .00and0 where,, =>⋅′= QQtQtX µµ
It is straightforward to see that performance increases both in skill and in 
usage. We can also see ( )xQt 11 −= µ is the required usage for reaching
performance x  . Note that we don't restrict the functional form of ( )⋅Q . The 
essential assumption is the multiplicative relationship between usage and skill, 
which enables us to obtain an explicit solution later4.
We consider the skill factor as an endowed characteristic of a user. Each 
user's skill parameter is drawn independently from a common skill distribution
( )µF with the density function ( )µf  . We assume ( )µF has a fixed support
[ ]µµ ,  , ( )µF is atomless, ( ) 0>µf  , and ( )µf ′ is bounded.
4 Note that we can easily extend to the case of  ( ) ( )xQt 11 −= µϕ   by redefining  ( )µϕ   as skill.
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We assume a user knows her own skill 5 and the common skill distribution
( )⋅F  . But a user does not know other users' skill or performance when deciding 
on her usage level.
The company awards the prizes based on the rank-order of users' 
performance. We assume the company has a fixed prize budget for the SBCC, 
normalized to 1. The company can award at most n prizes. Denote ( )nvvv ,...,, 21










We assume a user's utility from winning j th prize is jv
6. We consider a 
user's utility from the usage as tθ 7. At the same time, she has to make a payment 
tp  to the company. We are interested in the case where the net utility from each 
unit of usage is negative, i.e. p<θ . Such a case can arise in two scenarios: 1) the 
5 It is not uncommon that a user may overestimate or underestimate her own skill. However, our 
analysis should generally hold if users do not over-estimate or under-estimate their skills in a 
systematic way.
6 A user may get more than the monetary value of a prize by deriving emotional values from 
winning a prize (Ward and Hill 1991). These factors are not considered in this research.
7 In section 6, we discuss the cases when marginal disutility of usage increases or decreases.
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company tries to attract users who wouldn't consume the service if there is no 
prizes. 2) The company tries to enhance the sales among existing customers, who 
wouldn’t have consumed as much if there are no prizes. In both scenarios, the 
user’s net payoff from an additional unit of usage (if we don’t consider the prize 
utility) is negative. In the second scenario, we should interpret t  as the 
incremental usage due to the SBCC.
In our model, all users maximize their expected utility and their utility 
functions are identical. In particular, when a user's probability of winning prize j










We assume that at the point of designing the SBCC the company is 
uninformed about users' skill parameters. So from the company point of view a 
user's usage is a random variable. The expected profit from a user is ( )[ ]µtpE and 
the total revenue from a SBCC is ( )[ ]µtpnE .
We assume that the company’s marginal cost of service is zero (the case 
of linear marginal cost is similar). The company incurs a fixed cost K for 
administrating the SBCC. K may consist of the cost for prizes, the cost for 
advertising and other administrative cost.
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( )[ ] KtnE −= µπ (3) 
Because K does not affect any of the design problems below, we can drop
K from the company's objective function. But we still call π  as the company’s 
expected profit. 
The SBCC Game
The SBCC game unfolds as following. Before the SBCC starts, the 
company announces the prize structure and the rule of the SBCC. Meanwhile, 
each user learns their private skill parameter µ  , the common (prior) distribution
( )⋅F  , and the number of potential participants n  . When the SBCC starts, each 
user simultaneously and independently chooses her usage t  and their performance 
is jointly determined by their usage and skill. Then the company will evaluate 
each user's performance and awards prizes according to the announced rule.
It is worth pointing out that, the framework described above can also be 
applied to participation campaigns, such as encouraging users to write product 
reviews or testimonies, to provide feedback to services, and to exchange their 
experience about using the products. These user activities, while not generate 
direct revenue to the company, contribute to create and enhance user values. A 
SBCC may play a role in stimulating larger amount of user participation in these 
campaigns. By simply re-labeling variables, our model can accommodate the 
SBCCs used in these contexts as well. But in order to avoid confusion, we stick to 
the terminology that we use for the sales promotion context. 
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The Equilibrium Usage
A user's strategy involves choosing her usage level based on her skill µ
and other public information. We only consider the symmetric strategy 
equilibrium, in the sense that users with the same skill will choose the same level 
of usage in equilibrium. Let ( )µt denote the equilibrium mapping from one's skill 
to usage. Note that a symmetric strategy implies all users adopt the same ( )µt but 
it doesn’t mean each user ends up with same level of usage. As usual, we consider 
the Nash equilibrium strategy, i.e. if all other users adopts ( )µt then one's optimal 
strategy is also to adopt ( )µt  .
 Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Usage) 8  There is a unique symmetric 
equilibrium performance strategy for a SBCC, 















where ( )1+−= jjj vvjδ  is the prize money allocated to j th prize differential and 
( ) ( )σσω 1:1 −−= njnj Fj is the consumer’s expected share of jδ  in equilibrium.
According to proposition 1, the equilibrium usage increases in the utility 
from usage. But the equilibrium usage may not necessarily increase in skill, 
despite the fact that equilibrium performance always increases in skill (see 
8 All proofs are in the appendix.
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Appendix A3). In other words, in SBCCs a user may have high performance but 
not-so-high usage.
It is also worth noting that the equilibrium usage is not affected by ( )⋅Q  , 
which means that any order-preserving manipulation of the performance numbers 
will not have any effect on the equilibrium usage or profit. Such a property 
reflects the company's objective being maximizing users' input and it 
distinguishes SBCCs from other output-oriented contests. 
2.4 Optimal Prize Structure
2.4.1 The Optimal Prize Structure Problem
Note that in equilibrium ( )µty =  , plug (4) into (3), we can obtain the 
company's expected profit


































1 ∫∫−= (6) 
denote the marginal profit from j-th prize differential. Note that the prize budget 



























For an example of prize allocation in prize differentials, if the company
allocates the entire prize sum 1 to 5δ  , then the resulted prize structure is
2.054321 ===== vvvvv  . For another example, if the company allocates 8.0 to
1δ and 2.0 to 2δ  , then the resulted prize structure is 1.0,9.0 21 == vv  . 
 Proposition 2 (Optimal Prize Structure): The solution to the problem (8) 
is to split the prize sum equally among the first ∗j winners, where
{ }kjjj εε ≥∈∗ |  .
Proposition 2 states that companies should always spend their prize money 
to the most productive prize differential. The resulted prize structure can be either 
one grand prize, which we call a Winner-Take-All structure or 2≥∗j equal-sized 
prizes, which we call a Split-Prize  structure. 
The remaining question is how a company should choose between a 
Winner-Take-All prize structure and a Split-Prize structure. Unfortunately there is 
no unconditional answer to this question. The optimal prize structure depends on 
both the number of potential users and the distribution of skill levels. Recall that 
the optimal prize structure depends on the size of jε  's, which in turn depend both 
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on the skill distribution ( )⋅F and the size of contest (refer to 666). The following 
examples demonstrate that both Winner-Take-All and Split-Prize can be optimal.
Example 1: (Winner-Take-All) Skill is uniformly distributed on [1, 2].
5=n , 1and0 == pθ . The values of 1ε to 4ε are ,81.0,86.0,91.0  and 75.0
respectively Thus, the optimal number of prizes is 1.
Example 2 (Split-Prize) Skill follows Cauchy distribution on [ ]2,1  , with 
the location parameter 5.1=t and the scale parameter 02.0=s  . 5=n ,
1and0 == pθ  . Computation shows 1ε to 4ε are ,968.0,971.0,967.0  and 939.0
respectively. The optimal number of prizes is 2.
Fortunately, we are able to characterize conditions for Winner-Take-All in 
terms of the distribution of skill and the size of the contest. We show in the 
following that Winner-Take-All is often optimal.
2.4.2 A distribution condition for Winner-Take-All
 Proposition 3 (Distribution Condition) A Winner-Take-All prize structure 
is optimal if the skill distribution satisfies
( )








An immediate implication of Proposition 3 is that the entire class of 
hazard-rate-increasing distributions 9  satisfies (9), including uniform, normal, 
logistic, exponential, and etc (a proof is included in Appendix A7). It appears that 
with a wide range of distributions which we regard as normal, the Winner-Take-
All structure should be the optimal. 
Proposition 3 states that if the distribution of skill displays hazard-rate-
increasing property, the company should go for the Winner-Take-All prize 
structure, no matter what size of the contest is. To understand the reason behind 
the proposition, we need to consider how the prize allocation affects users of 
different skill. In the following figure, we depict marginal profit of the first and 
the second prize differentials with respect to different skill levels. We can see a 
differential between the first and the second prize generates more profit from 
high-skilled users and less from low-skilled users, compared with a differential 
between the second and the third prize. Hazard-rate-increasing condition ensures 
that overall profit from an increase in the first prize differential is larger than that 
in the second prize differential. In fact, the same condition ensures the first prize 
9 In our case, hazard rate is interpreted as the rate of elimination, i.e. the conditional probability of 
eliminating an opponent. For more technical details on hazard-rate-increasing distributions, please 
refer to, e.g., Bagnoli and Bergstrom 1989.
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differential dominates every other prize differential in terms of overall marginal 
profit. 
Figure 8. Marginal Profit of the First and the Second Prize Differential
by Skill Level, n=5.
An important message for designers of SBCCs is that it is wrong to look at 
the sheer size of population on each skill-segment when deciding the optimal 
prize structure. One may intuitively think that when there are more low-skilled 
users, the company should award more prizes to appeal to them. However, one 
has ignored the fact that these low-skilled users are less interested to compete 
because there are more of them. Instead the companies should pay attention to the 
hazard rate. Only if the hazard-rate for the low-skilled users is higher than that of 
high-skilled users, the company should consider giving more prizes. Proposition 3 
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also suggests to the practioners that it is often more profitable to appeal to high-
skilled segment than low-skilled segment through a Winner-Take-All prize 
structure.
2.4.3 A Size Condition for Winner-Take-All
We need an additional assumption on the regularity of the distribution to 
proceed.
Assumption: (regularity) 0>∃ε  , s.t. ( ) µεµ ∀≥ ,f  .
 Proposition 4 (Size Condition) If the regularity assumption holds, the 
Winner-Take-All prize structure is optimal for a sufficiently large n  .
The intuition behind this proposition is as following. When the size of the 
SBCC increases, the marginal profit from a low-skilled user vanishes more 
quickly than the marginal profit from a high-skilled user, which is true for all 
prize differentials. When n  increases, low-skilled segment becomes increasingly 
irrelevant to the total marginal profit. Recall that the high-skilled segment is 
where a high-ranked prize differential has the advantage. As a result, when n is 
large enough, the first prize differential dominates all other prize differentials and 
Winner-Take-All becomes the optimal prize structure. Because SBCCs usually 
involve thousands of users, we think it is highly likely that proposition 4 will 
apply.
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Figure 9. Marginal Profit of the First and the Second Prize Differential
by Skill Level, n=15.
Proposition 4 predicts that even for certain distributions the optimal prize 
structure is Split-Prize, it will eventually switch to Winner-Take-All as the size of 
contest becomes larger and larger. The following example verifies this prediction.
Example 3. Let ( ) ( )411−= µµF  . We tabulate the optimal number of prizes 
and expected profit when n goes from 5 to 8 below.
n 5 6 7 8
∗j 4 5 1 1
π 0.841 0.845 0.850 0.860
Table 1: Effect of Size on Optimal Prize Structure
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To summarize this section, our main result is that Winner-Take-All is 
most likely optimal, despite a SBCC may admit either Winner-Take-All or Split-
Prize as its optimal prize structure. Proposition 3 and proposition 4 shed light on 
how the distribution factor and the size factor will affect the tradeoff between 
high-skilled users and low-skilled users. They provide important guidance on the 
choice of optimal prize structure.
One may contemplate whether the optimal number of prizes in a SBCC
has an upper bound -- for instance, Kalra and Shi (2001) have found in there 
model context that the number of prizes should not exceed 50% of the number of 
contestants. However, such an upper bound does not exist in our context. A piece 
of evidence is in example 3: note that when n = 6, the optimal number of prizes is 
5.
2.4.4 SBCCs with reservation utility
The main part of our analysis assumes a friction-free environment in the 
sense that users don't incur any upfront cost to participate a SBCC. Now we 
extend the analysis to a context with frictions on the user part, which we model as 
a fixed reservation utility R for all users. R can be interpreted as any entry cost, 
which one incurs upon participation, e.g. spend time learning the rules of the 
SBCC or registering herself as a participant. Since such a cost can be avoided if 
one does not participate in the SBCC, a user will expect she get at least R by 
participating.
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The following proposition extends our previous results on the optimal 
prize structure to this case.
 Proposition 9 (Optimal Prize Structure with Reservation Utility) If 
Winner-Take-All is the optimal prize structure for a contest without reservation 
utility, so it is for a contest with a reservation utility 0>R  .
2.5 Contest Structure
In this section we study several other decision variables in SBCC design. 
We start by analyzing the impact of the size of user population and the skill 
distribution on users' usage and the company's profit. We then study the 
segmentation and the entry fee issues. These analyses provide important insights 
for such practical questions as whether a company should hold SBCCs at different 
skill levels and whether a company should hold regional SBCCs instead of a 
global one.
2.5.1 The Impact of Size on Profit
 Proposition 5 (Size and Profit) If the Distribution Condition or the Size 
Condition is satisfied, the company's profit increases in n  . However, the total 
expected profit does not exceed θ−p
p
 .
When adding an additional participant, the direct effect is she will make 
additional usage. The indirect effect is that she causes others to lower their usage
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levels. This proposition implies that the direct effect is stronger than indirect 
effect, but as n becomes larger, the gap between two effects converges to zero. 
The following figure illustrates the profit trend predicted by proposition 5 
(assuming a Winner-Take-All prize structure and skill is uniformly distributed on 
[0.5, 1]).
Figure 10. Effect of Size on Expected profit
Proposition 5 implies that for a given prize budget the company cannot 
infinitely increase its profit by expanding the pool of potential participants, even 
if we do not consider the cost of doing so. In practice there is always additional 
cost for administrating a larger SBCC. For instance, processing more contest 
entries will require more labor hours and/or more computer facility; the 
advertising expenditure will also be higher for a larger SBCC campaign. In such a 
case, a company has to tradeoff the decreasing marginal profit with the non-trivial 
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cost of admitting one more user. Thus, there will be an optimal size for a SBCC
beyond which point a company will lose money.
2.5.2 The Impact of the Skill Distribution on Profit
Although a company cannot change the skill of a user, it can however 
influence the skill distribution of a SBCC through, say, segmentation (e.g. 
professional group and amateur group) and admission policies. Therefore, it is 
necessary to understand the how the skill distribution affects the company's 
profits. It is worth pointing out that despite obvious relevance of this issue to the 
practice, to our best knowledge there is no prior research directly addressing such 
an issue in a general distribution case as we do.
 Proposition 6 (Skill Distribution and Profit) Consider two SBCCs 1C  with 
skill distribution ( )⋅F and 2C with skill distribution ( )⋅G  .They are the same 
otherwise. Denote ( )⋅−1F ( ( )⋅−1G  ) as inverse distribution function 10  for ( )⋅F
( ( )⋅G  ) and denote ( )ut1  ( ( )ut2  ) be the equilibrium usage in 1C  ( 2C  ) for a user


















10 Formally,  ( ) ( ){ }uFuF ≤=− µµ :sup1  . An inverse distribution function maps a value of 
the underlying variable to a percentage.
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then for any 10 << u  , ( ) ( )utut 21 >  . Furthermore, 1C  generates higher profit 
than 2C  .
Note that ( ) ( )sFuF 11 / −− measures the inequality of skills between two 
skill levels u and s  . For instance, if %80=u and %50=s  , then ( ) ( )sFuF 11 / −−
is the ratio of skill between a user whose skill is higher than %80 and a user
whose skill is higher than %50  . Proposition 6 states that if ( )⋅F displays 
systematically lower inequality than ( )⋅G  , then a user in 1C will consume more 
than a corresponding user (i.e. a user at the same skill percentage) in 2C  .  In 
other words, in a more matched-up SBCC users compete systematically more 
fiercely for prizes. It is also worth noting that Proposition 6 predicts that not only 
a company who maximizes total usage will prefer 1C to 2C  , but also any 
company whose objective function is an increasing function of total usage.
We use the following stylized examples to discuss the implications of 
proposition 6.
Example 4. (a). Let F be a uniform distribution on ],[ ba  and G be a 

























 . So we conclude that F
generates lower profit than G  .
(b). Let F be an arbitrary distribution on [ ]ba,  , and G be a distribution 














==  . We conclude that F
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generates equal profit as G and this conclusion can be verified through 
conventional method.
(c). Let F be an arbitrary distribution on [ ]ba,  , and G be a distribution 
on [ ]22 ,ba and ( ) =xG ( )2xF  . Because ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )sF uFsF uFsG uG 111111 2 −−−−−− >=  . We conclude that
F generates higher profit than G  . 
The above examples can be interpreted as a repeated SBCC environment 
where every user gains their skills overtime. If every user gains skill by the same 
amount (case a), the company is better off since the ratio of skill between u and
s decreases. However, if the user's skill level increases proportionally (case b), 
the company's profit is invariant. If the users gain their skill in a convex fashion 
(case c), the company is worse off because basically now u has even more 
advantage over s  . Conversely, if the users gain their skill in a concave fashion 
(the converse of case c), the company will be better off. To this end, a company
has an incentive to help low-skilled customer learn faster to make a more 
competitive SBCC.
We can also view Proposition 6 from a different angle. Consider let
( ) ( )( )µφ 11 −− = FuG  , we can see that a SBCC with distribution ( )⋅G and a 
performance function ( )tX ,µ and a contest with distribution ( )⋅F and a 
performance function ( )( )tX ,µφ are in fact equivalent. By this alternative view, 
we can get additional insight from Proposition 6.
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Corollary 1 (Performance function) Consider a SBCC 1C with 
performance function ( )tX ,µ and a SBCC 2C with performance function
( )tX ,ˆ µ  . Assume ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )µφµφµ tQtXtX == ,,ˆ  . The two SBCCs are the same 
otherwise. 1C generates higher profit than 2C if the marginal rate of substitution 


















tX tt ∀> (11)
According to corollary 3, if the company can choose a SBCC performance 
function that permits usage as a stronger substitute for skill, then the company can 
get higher profit from the SBCC. By doing this, the company essentially 
handicaps the high-skilled users --- although they still have the same level of skill 
as before, they have less advantage over the low-skilled users.
2.5.3 Segmentation of the Population
Real world contests often further segment participants into smaller groups. 
NBA holds regional conferences before the finals. The Mobile Millionaire contest 
classifies players into four stages based on their experience and past performance. 
The question is whether these segmentation strategies will generate more profit 
for companies in the SBCC context. We consider segmentation in two categories: 
segmentation based on the skill factor, which we call the vertical segmentation,
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and segmentation based on non-skill factors such as geographic regions, which we 
call the horizontal segmentation.
In horizontal segmentation we assume the skill distribution for each 
segment is the same as the whole population. Therefore the SBCC for each 
segment resembles the SBCC for the entire population except that it has smaller 
size. Proposition 5 predicts that when everything is the same (including the prize 
budget), a smaller SBCC generates less profit than a larger SBCC under the 
Distribution Condition or the Size Condition. We can quickly conclude that given 
the same prize budget, the company can not get higher profits by horizontal 
segmentation.
For the case of vertical segmentation, we assume that the company can 
separate the users into a high-skill group and a low-skill group, e.g. through some 
qualifications or past performance. Such a segmentation strategy will cause the 
skill distribution for each segment to be different that of the original population. 
Consequently, both size effect (Proposition 5) and the distribution effect 
(Proposition 6) apply. While reducing the size of contest will reduce the expected 
profit, grouping users by skill may raise the usage level and therefore the expected 
profit. The following example shows it is possible to raise the overall expected 
profit by a vertical segmentation.
Example 5: (Vertical Segmentation) Consider a non-segmented SBCC 0C
with 20 users and two vertically-segmented SBCCs 1C and 2C with 10 users 
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each. Assume the skill distribution for 0C is uniform distribution on [1, 2] and the 
skill distribution for 1C and 2C are uniform distributions on [1, 1.5] and [1.5, 2] 
respectively. We still assume the reservation utility 0=θ  . The company has a 
prize budget 1 for 0C and it allocates 0.75 and 0.25 to 1C and 2C respectively. 
Our computation shows that the expected profit from 0C is 0.9756, while the 
aggregate expected profit from 1C and 2C is 0.9797.
 Proposition 7 (Segmentation) Assume the Distribution Condition or the 
Size Condition is satisfied and the prize budget is fixed. The company can not get 
higher profit through horizontal segmentation but may get higher profit through 
vertical segmentation.
2.5.4 Entry fee
Charging an entry fee causes three effects: a) it excludes low-skilled users 
whose utility of participation is low. b) It affects the equilibrium consumption of 
participating users. c) Entry fee itself becomes an additional source of revenue for 
the company. Below we analyze the overall effect of charging an entry fee. In 
order to simplify the derivation, we focus on the Winner-Take-All case.
Proposition 8 (Entry Fee) For a given entry fee E , the marginal user ( eµ ), 





=− −− µθ 1:1
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p ∫−<1 , the company should charge an optimal entry fee. The 
























 is high enough, the company should charge no entry fee.
By this proposition, charging an entry fee may increase the company’s 
profits. Whether or not to charge an entry fee depends on the size of user’s 
intrinsic utility relative to their payment. If the intrinsic utility is very low, 
excluding low-skilled users through an entry fee is profitable because an entry fee 
allows the company to extract more surplus from the participating users. Note that 
part of the revenue from participating users is entry fee. In other words, the 
company swaps part of the consumption revenue with entry fee revenue by 
charging an entry fee. Such a swap is not worthwhile when the intrinsic utility is 
high because entry fee revenue does not capture intrinsic utility. Therefore, when 
the intrinsic utility from consumption is high, it is no longer profitable to charge 
an entry fee. 
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2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 Maximizing the number of participants
Sometimes, the objective of SBCCs leans more toward promotes the 
awareness of product from the broadest audience rather than directly targeting on 
the total profit. In such case, maximizing the number of participants becomes the 
company's objective. When there is no reservation utility, all users will participant 
no matter what -- so the issue of prize structure becomes irrelevant to this 
objective. When there is reservation utility, however, we have to consider what 
prize structure attracts the maximum number of users. We analyze the latter case 
below.
Assume there is a reservation utility 0>R  . Let 0µ be the cutoff skill 














Because the company maximizes the number of participating users, it 
wants the 0µ as low as possible. Note that the ( )µω j increases in µ  , in order to 
keep 0µ low, the company should assign the entire prize sum to the prize 
differential with the highest coefficient.
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Proposition 10 (Prize Structure That Maximizes Participation) Let ( )µω
be the upper envelope of the function family ( ){ }1..1, −= njj µω  . In order to 
maximize the number of participants, the company should optimally give ∗j
equal-sized prizes where ∗j is the subscript of the function on the envelope at ∗µ
and ∗µ solves ( )µω=R  . Moreover, the optimal number of prizes ∗j decreases 
in R and in n and is independent of skill distribution ( )⋅F  .
In the following figure, we illustrate the envelope of ( )µω1 to ( )µω9 in a 
SBCC with 10 potential contestants. 







2.6.2 Skill-Based Contests with Non-Linear Cost
We consider a case where the net disutility from usage can be convex or 
concave. For simplicity, we consider the class of disutility functions, αθ t  . 
Following the steps in Proposition 1, we can obtain the new equilibrium usage,











−= ∫∑ dpt jj  (15)
The following picture illustrates how the degree of concavity affects 
equilibrium usage at different skill levels.
Figure 12. Equilibrium Usage and α
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As we can see when the concavity increases, high-skilled users compete 
less aggressively. Intuitively, high-ranked prizes, which appeal high-skilled users 
the most, become less effective. Thus the optimal prize structure tends to allocate 
more to the low-ranked prizes. We use the following example to verify this 
intuition.
Example 7: (optimal prize structure and concavity of disutility) we assume 
the company can offer a maximum of two prizes. When 5.0=α  , the expected
profit under Winner-Take-All and Split-Prize are 0.50 and 0.30 respectively. 
Winner-Take-All is optimal. When 3=α  , however, the expected profit under 
Winner-Take-All and Split-Prize are 1.98 and 2.19 respectively. Split-Prize is 
optimal. It is worth noting that a non-equal-sized prize structure may be optimal.
For instance, when 25.11 =α  , we find that the optimal prize structure is a 
0.65/0.35 split between the first and second prize.
While the optimal prize structure in nonlinear disutility case is generally 
more complicated to determine, the basic intuition in the above example applies 
to more general case. 
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Chapter 3. An Empirical Analysis of Status Seeking in 
Mobile Gaming 
In chapter 1 we argued that users in online entertainment communities not 
only derive intrinsic utility from consuming the online entertainment service but 
also the value of status by obtaining a superior performance relative their peers. In 
this chapter, we empirically verify whether status seeking behavior is a driving 
force in mobile gaming using a mobile gaming dataset. By studying status seeking 
behavior, we hope to enhance our understanding of users’ playing patterns and 
provide a diagnosis for the current design of the mobile game. 
A major challenge of studying status seeking is that the effect of status 
seeking may be compounded with that of other factors. At the first sight, a user 
may play a game as much because it is fun as because she is pursuing a status 
among her peers. Similarly, a user may stop playing because she is no longer 
having fun or she is not interested in seeking status. A further examination helps 
us to differentiate these two driving forces.
The status seeking perspective suggests that a user will devote effort to 
achieve a satisfying status. She will stop if the status is reached and she will 
continue trying if the target status is not reached and her effort has not yet reach a 
threshold level. Such a behavior presumption is consistent with our theoretical 
model in chapter two, where a user will choose a target performance level and 
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achieve that by choosing a certain level of effort (except that here we take the 
uncertain outcome in consideration). If the user follows such a behavior pattern, 
she tends not to stop if she gets a low score and to stop if she gets a high score. In 
contrary, the intrinsic utility perspective suggests that an unsatisfying experience 
will cause the user to stop while a satisfying experience will cause the user not to 
stop, were users to base her calculations of the expected utility of the next game 
on her past experience.  By such an argument, a user will tend to continue to play 
if she gets a high score and to stop if she gets a low score. Such a contrast forms 
our basis for testing status seeking behavior. 
3.1 Data
The dataset we have is users’ playing records in the Mobile Millionaire
game. The data was collected by a European wireless operator. The game was 
launched in October 2001 on the SMS (short message) platform. The dataset 
contains game-by-game playing data of all active users over a 7-month period 
from February 2003 to August 2003. 
Mobile Millionaire is a quiz game played via cell phone. Players’ 
objective is to correctly answer trivia questions served by game server through 
wireless networks to progress up the virtual money tree. In the version of game 
we study, a player has to answer a total of 15 questions to reach the 1,000,000 
points, the highest one could reach. The player has to answer the current question 
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correctly to proceed with a new question. If a user picks the wrong answer, the 
game ends. Like the TV millionaire, the question 3 and the question 5 are safe 
heavens in the game (see the table below). If a player answers wrong above a safe 
heaven, she will get the points of the safe heaven level instead of getting 0. One 
can also choose to walk away to secure the points she currently have.
We recoded game points in the dataset according to the number of correct 
answers one has to answer correctly in a row in order to reach that game points 
(refer to table 2). Using the recoded game points for regression has an advantage 
over the original point scheme: the coefficient for recoded game points represents 



















Table 2. Game points and its coding
There are also 3 lifelines available for players, including a “50:50” lifeline 
which removes two wrong answers, an “asking the audience” lifeline which gives 
statistics on other players’ answers to the same question, and a “phone a friend”
lifeline, which sends player a hint (by the server).
A player needs to send a short message to the server to initialize the game. 
After she starts playing, each of her requests and server’s responses take the form 
of short messages. Players pay the normal per-message fee but do not pay any 
premium charge for the game. 
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There are monthly prizes for top 5 players, each worth about $1450. In 
addition, the mobile network maintains a monthly hall of fame which is available 
to users through SMS or through the Internet. 
According to game professionals, the game is usually played in a social 
context: a group of friends will play the game at the same time, each of them 
playing on their own phone.
A summary of the dataset over the seven month period is illustrated in 
table 3. 
Number of games 97727
Number of sessions 54572
Number of (active) users 36418
Avg sessions per user 1.50
Avg games per user 2.68
Avg games per session 1.79
Avg points per game 2.10
Avg time per game 149 seconds
Table 3. Summary Statistics
3.2 Model Development
3.2.1 Choice of the dependent variable
Although our dataset permits the analysis of different variables including 
the number of games played (count),  the interval between two games (duration), 
and the decision of continuing/stop (choice), we are most interested in studying 
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the stopping decision made after each game, i.e. whether one would like to end 
this session. 
A stream of binary decisions across a large number of individuals has been 
studied in other applications. Moe and Fader (2004) studied the conversion 
behavior in online shopping environment. In their model, the dataset consists of a 
stream of online store visits and associated purchase decision. The purchase 
decision in their context corresponds to the stop decision in our context. Other 
possible areas of application include new product trial (Fader et al 2003) and 
online search.
We recoded our dependent variable, continue, to be 0, if a user decided to 
end the session, and to be 1 otherwise. In order to identify a game session (i.e. a 
number of games played in a row), we have consulted a manager who is very 
knowledgeable about the game. Based on his input, we decided that if the interval 
between two consecutive games is longer than 60 minutes, the later game is 
considered as belonging to a new session. Due to the truncation of the dataset, the 
subsequent interval for the last game is defined as from the last game to the end of 
the month. Since the number of users who played at the very end of the month is 
only a small portion, the truncation problem is neglectable. 
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3.2.2 The Logistic Regression
Our basic model is a random utility model. Let itU  denote the user i 's
expected utility of playing the next game at game t  and itε  is an unobservable 
random term. 
ititit Uy ε+=
A user will continue to play if 0>ity  otherwise she will end the session. 
The probability of observing the user i  to continue playing after playing game t
is
{ } { } ( )ititit UFUti =>+= 0Probat continueProb ε
If we assume itε ’s are independently distributed according to the logistic 
distribution, This leads to the familiar Logit model. The log-likelihood function 
for the above model is,
( ){ ( ) ( )( )}ititit itit UFcontinueUFcontinueL −−+= ∑ 1log1loglog
We consider itU  to be affected by the following components.
Baseline utility. For each user, there is a baseline expected utility of 
playing the game, independent of her past experience with the game. The baseline 
utility reflects the overall fun of playing the game. 
Effect of near-term past performance. First of all, the users’ past 
performance will alter her experience about the game thereby affect her expected 
utility of playing a next game. If a user has had a good play, she will adjust her 
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expected utility upward.  So we expect a good performance in current game will 
have a negative impact on the probability of stop. 
Second, past performance also affects the expected gain of status for the 
next game. If a user has got a good performance in the last game, she has less to 
gain in the next game. Thus from status seeking perspective, her probability of 
continuing will decrease in past performance. 
We tend to think status seeking dominates intrinsic utility in this game 
setting. One reason is that this game is not particularly fun to play compared with 
many other PC or console games. It is somewhat cumbersome because users have 
to memorize and type a handful of commands. Another reason is that this game is 
usually played in a social context, which implies that getting a low score would 
embarrass a user in front of others and getting a high score would bring her glory. 
For these reasons, we believe that the near term experience negatively affects the 
probability of continuing. 
In our model, we use the score of last game (score) to approximate a 
user’s near term experience. The sign of the coefficient will allow us to detect or 
reject status seeking hypothesis.
Effect of long-term past performance. Similar to near term performance, 
having a good performance in the past plays means the user is probably having 
fun, which in turn affects his expectation of the next play. Therefore, the intrinsic 
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utility perspective suggests that the long-term performance to have a positive 
effect on the probability of stop. 
The influence of status seeking, however, may not be as strong as in a 
short term. One reason is that a user may play with different friends at a different 
time, so that her past performance does not have much to do with her status in the 
current group. For these reasons, we hypothesize that intrinsic utility argument 
dominates in a long term so that the overall effect of the long-term performance is 
positive. 
We use the average points collected in past games (avg_points) as a proxy 
for her long-term past performance.
Performance Effect
Near-term performance Long-term performance
Intrinsic Utility + +
Status Seeking – No
Overall – +
Table 4. Performance effect
Game effect. We expect a user’s expected utility to decrease as the 
number of games played in a particular session increases. This effect causes a user 
to stop even if she has had good experience with the game. As the number of 
game increases, the expected marginal gain in status also decreases. This is 
because status seeking process is like a repeated sampling process. If one doesn’t 
get a good score after a large number of tries, she probably will not get it the next 
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time. In summary, we expect that the number of games in a session has a negative 
effect on the probably of continuing.
Session effect. A user’s interests in playing the game may increase (if she 
gets addicted) or decline (if she gets bored with the game) in the number of 
sessions. In our case, we expect the expect utility to decline in the number of 
sessions. One reason is the cumbersome design of the SMS-based Mobile 
Millionaire. Another reason is that there is not much variation in the game to keep 
users’ experience fresh. We expect the status seeking to have no strong long-term 
effect. We hypothesize that the number of sessions has a negative impact on the 
probability of continuing. 
Effect of time on continue
Game effect Session effect
Intrinsic Utility – –
Status Seeking – No
Overall – –
Table 5. Effect of time on continue
Heterogeneity users. We consider the heterogeneity of users in two 
dimensions. One dimension is that the general tendency to play such games varies 
among users. To capture such variation, we differentiate users who played just 
one session (trial group) during the 7 month period and who played multiple 
sessions (regular group). We use a dummy variable (singletry) to separate two 
groups. We expect the trial group to have a lower tendency to continue. Another 
dimension is that users may play games at different frequencies. We use the total 
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number of games played over the 7 month (total_games) period to accommodate 
such difference. We expect the coefficient of total_games to be positive. 
Other control variables. We introduce a group of dummy variables 
(week_of_year) to remove time-based variations in the dataset, such as caused by 
a promotion event. There are total of 31 weeks recorded in our dataset. We 
include a class variable end-reason (which takes 5 values: CA-Correct Answer, 
WA-Wrong Answer, GE-Game Ends, TO-Time Out, WAW-Walk Away, NA-
Unknown) to remove any effect caused by different ending mode. We include the 
interval before the game (interval-before) in case it has any impact on the 
dependent variable. Finally, we notice that the behavior pattern is different if a 
user gets zero point in a game than gets positive points, so we add a dummy 
variable (zeropoints) to capture such effect. The following table provides 
descriptive statistics for the variables.
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Continue 0.442027       0.496630 0 1
score 0.768795 0.928269 0 4
zeropoints 0.519212 0.499633 0 1
singletry 0.514791 0.499784 0 1
total_games 11.75594 37.12035 1 361
avg_points 1.397252 1.77071 0 14
session_nbr 2.819518 7.682293 1 137
game_within_session 1.738619 1.859093 1 63
interval_before (seconds) 12083.85 21961.57 0 300493
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics
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3.4 Results
Our model was estimated using the Probit procedure in SAS 8.0. Table 7
reports the regression results. The likelihood ratio is 22278.7653 (with a degree of 
freedom 42), indicating an overall model fit. The regression confirmed our 
hypothesis about the near-term effect. The score of the current game has a strong 
positive effect on the probability of stop. This implies a strong status-seeking 
motive among the users – that one wouldn’t be satisfied with a low score. A 
positive coefficient also implies that once a user gets a high score, she tends to 
stop. Such a behavior is not explained by intrinsic utility argument. We also 
notice that zeropoints has a very strong positive effect on probability of 
continuing, which also suggest the existence of status seeking motive. 
Average past performance in a relative long term has a sizable positive 
effect on probability of continuing. This implies a user with a good overall 
experience with the game tends to playing more games in a session. 
Our result confirms a negative session effect (session_nbr). However, the 
result rejects a negative game effect (game_within_session). One possible 
explanation is the selection effect: as game_with_session increases, the user is 
more likely to have higher tendency to play. The effect of Interval_before is not 
significantly different from zero. This suggests the game interval does not build 
up or reduce users’ tendency to play longer. 
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Regressors DOF Estimation Std Err Pr>ChiSq
Intercept** 1 -1.3634 0.0849 <.0001
Zeropoints** 1 1.4644 0.0373 <.0001
Singletry** 1 -0.294 0.0168 <.0001
Total_games** 1 0.0184 0.0006 <.0001
Score** 1 -0.5299 0.0226 <.0001
avg_points** 1 0.1416 0.0091 <.0001
Session_nbr** 1 -0.0444 0.002 <.0001
Game_within_session** 1 0.0438 0.0071 <.0001
interval_before** 1 0 0 <.0001
end_reason        CA** 1 0.4409 0.1434 0.0021
end_reason        GE 1 0.4514 0.1948 0.0205
end_reason        NA** 1 0.2155 0.0573 0.0002
end_reason        TO** 1 0.4268 0.0704 <.0001
end_reason        WA** 1 0.6432 0.0519 <.0001
end_reason        WAW 0 0 0 .
Table 7. Regression results
We have omitted the regression results for week_of_year dummies since 
there are 30 of them. But we do see a significant positive effect in some weeks 
(e.g. week 16, 17, 18, and 19). That probably means the promotion campaign was 
taking effects among these weeks. 
3.5 Discussion and Future Research
The main finding of this regression is that while intrinsic utility of playing 
the game has a positive effect on playing in the long term, in the short term status 
seeking is the noticable driving force of game play. Because of status seeking, a 
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user tends to continuing playing while their performance is poor and to stop 
playing when their performance is satisfying. 
We did not find long-term status seeking effect in this dataset. This 
suggests that the game company should work on inducing status seeking across 
session.  The main issue may lie in the use of the highest performance as a way to 
rank a player. If the game designer could choose a performance measure that can 
adjust more frequently to game-to-game play, users may come back more often. 
This empirical work can be enhanced in a few ways. First of all, a 
consideration of heterogeneity in status seeking behavior is desirable. Especially, 
we are interested in how status seeking changes with users’ characteristics and 
with time. Second, the logistic regression can be compared with other possible 
models, such as a Beta-Binomial model and the conversion model proposed by 
Moe and Fader (2004). 
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Appendix
A1 Order Statistics and Its Properties
Let nMMM ,...,, 21  be n  random variables independently drawn from the 
common distribution ( )⋅F . The corresponding order statistics are iM ’s arranged 
in non-decreasing order. The smallest of the sMi '  is denoted as nM :1 , the second 
smallest is denoted by nM :2 , and so on. Thus nnnn MMM ::2:1 ... ≤≤≤ . Denote 
( ) ( ) ( )⋅⋅⋅ nnnn FFF ::2:1 ,...,,  as their cumulative distribution functions. We also 
define ( ) ( ) 0and1 :1:0 ≡≡ + µµ nnn FF . It is well known that 
( ) ( ) ( )( )



































We define ( ) ( )µµω 1:: 1 −−= njnnj Fj  and use ( )µω j  as a short-hand for 
( )σω nj: . In our paper, ( )µω j  represents the equilibrium (expected) share of prize 
differential j  of a user whose skill is µ .
Based on (16), we can derive the formula to be used in this paper.
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( ) njj &0,0 ==µω (19)
( ) ( )
n
dfj
1=∫ µµµωµµ . (20)
To see the last formula,  



















































































































A2 Single Crossing Property
Definition (single crossing property). A function ( )xf  is single-crossing on 
[ ]ba,  if ( ) ( ) [ ]bayxxyyfxf ,, and,00 ∈>∀≥⇒≥ .
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Lemma A1: ( ) ( )xgxf ,  are continuous functions defined on  [ ]ba, .
Assume  ( ) 0=∫ dxxfba   and ( )xf  is single-crossing.  ( ) ( ) 0≥∫ dxxgxfba   if either 
of the following conditions is satisfied.
(a)  ( ) 0≥′ xg  on  [ ]ba, . 
(b) ( ) 0≥′ xg on [ ]b,χ , ( ) ( )χgxg ≤  on [ ]χ,a , and ( ) 0≤χf . 
Proof:
According to the single-crossing property, there exists ξ  on [ ]ba,  such 
that ( ) ( ) ξξ >≥≤≤ xxfxxf for ,0andfor ,0 . 
(a).  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxgxfdxxgxfdxxgxf baba ∫+∫=∫ ξξ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0=∫=∫+∫≥ dxxfgdxxfgdxxfg baba ξξξ ξξ
(b).  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxgxfdxxgxfdxxgxf baba ∫+∫=∫ χχ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxfgdxxfg ba ∫+∫≥ χχ ξχ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxfgdxxfg ba ∫+∫≥ χχ ξξ
( ) ( ) 0=∫= dxxfg baξ .  
Lemma A2: (a) If ji < , ( ) ( )µωµω ji −  is single-crossing on ( )µµ, .
(b) if nn >' , ( ) ( )' :': µωµω njnj nn − is single-crossing on ( )µµ, .
Proof: According to (17),
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )

































Note that the term in square brackets monotonically increases in x . For 
any a  such that ( ) ( ) 0>− aa ji ωω , it must be that the term in squire brackets is 
positive for ( )aFx = . Since the integrand is positive on [ ]µ,a , the entire term is 
also positive on [ ]µ,a . The single-crossing property holds on ( )µµ,  instead of 
[ ]µµ ,  because the entire term is zero at two ends. 
By the same logic, we can show (b). Just to note that
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )





























A3 Proof of Proposition 1 
(Step 1) Let  ( )µx   denote the equilibrium performance and assume  ( )µx
is strictly increasing (we will check this is indeed true in step 2). Let  ( )xU ,µ
denote the expected utility when a user's skill is  µ   and she chooses performance  
x  . A user’s probability of winning prize j  is equal to the probability that her 
performance falls between ( )jn − th lowest and ( )1+− jn th lowest performance 
of the rest 1−n  users. It is also equivalent to her skill level (if she also plays 
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according to ( )µx ) falls between ( )jn − th lowest skill level and ( )1+− jn th 
lowest skill level of the rest 1−n  skill levels, i.e. 
( )( ) ( )( )xxFxxF njnnjn 11:111: −−+−−−− −
where  ( )⋅−1x  is the inverse of  ( )⋅x . Her expected utility (let 01 =+nv )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )








































By our notation ( )1+−= jjj vvjδ  and ( ) ( )µµω 1:1 −−= njnj Fj ,













Because ( )µx   has to maximize her utility, it is necessary that











In a symmetric-strategy equilibrium, ( ) µ=− xx 1 . Plug into (22) and 
rearrange terms, we get









The lowest-skilled user always chooses zero performance in equilibrium, 
so that ( ) 0=µx . Using this as a boundary condition, we can solve the above 
differential equation to obtain an explicit solution,





























(Part II) Now we verify that (23) is indeed strictly increasing. Note that 
( )⋅Q   is increasing, so it is sufficient to show that the term in parentheses is 
increasing. It is true because  0≥jδ   (inequality holds for at least one  j  ) and  
( ) 0≥∫ σωσµµ jd   for any  µ   and any  j  by (18).
(Part III) We now show that  ( )µx  is also sufficient to maximize ( )xU ,µ . 
Assume a user with skill  µ   can choose an arbitrary performance ( )'' µxx = . Note 
that
( )( )



















By the first order condition (21), ( )( ) 0/, =′∂′∂ µµµ xU   at  µµ =′  . 
Further more, because  ( ) 0>⋅′Q   and  ( ) 0>⋅′x  ,  ( )( ) 0/, >′∂′∂ µµµ xU  on ( ]µµ ,'
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and ( )( ) 0/, <′∂′∂ µµµ xU  on [ )',µµ . Therefore, µµ =′  is a global maximum for  
( )( )µµ ′xU , . Since this holds for every µ , we conclude that ( )µx  is optimal. The 
proof process implies it is also unique.
A4 Proof of Proposition 2
As becoming obvious in problem (8), the optimal strategy is to allocate the 
entire sum to the prize differential with the largest coefficient. Only to note that 
because 0=nε  and  0>jε   for any  nj < , it is never optimal to allocate the prize 
sum to nδ . In other words, the company should always keep  0=nv .  
A5 Proof of Proposition 3
Exchanging the sequence of integration in (6), followed by integration by 
parts, we obtain
( ) ( )








































Consider the difference between coefficients kεε and1 .



























1∫−= , then 
the above becomes






Notice that  ( ) ( ) 0,; =∫ σσσηµµ dfnk   by (20) and ( )nk,,ση  is single-
crossing by Lemma A2(a). According to Lemma A1(a), a strictly increasing  
( )σH   is sufficient for  01 >− kεε . Since this holds for every 2≥k , we conclude 
that 1ε  is the largest if ( )σH  monotonically increases. 
A6 Proof of Proposition 4.
Consider (24). Now we examine an arbitrary  ( )σH  . Note that ( )σH  is 
continuous and is strictly negative everywhere except ( ) 0=µH . Furthermore, 
conditioning on ( ) ( )2/ σσ ff ′  is bounded ( )σH  strictly increasing at  µ
neighborhood. To see this, note that




σ →→+=′ ∫ as,11'1 2 dFffH
Thus, there must exist  µχ <  such that  ( )σH  strictly increases on  
[ ]µχ ,  and ( ) ( ) [ )χσχσ ,on HH < . In order to invoke Lemma A2 (b), all we need 
to show is ( ) 0,; <nkχη . We proceed in two steps.
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Claim 1: For any  2≥k  , there exists large enough  n   such that  
( ) 0,; <nkχη .
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )( )































































































As  ,∞→n ( )( )( ) ∞→−−−− ikFFikn χχ11 . So ( ) 0,; <nkχη  for large enough n . 
Claim 2: for large enough k ,  ( ) 0,; <nkχη .
( ) ( ) ( )( )















































As  ∞→k , ( ) −∞→− −111 kkF χ , so that ( ) 0,; <nkχη  for large enough k . 
This holds independent of n  (as long as kn ≥ ). Combining the claim 1 and the 
claim 2, we conclude that kεε >1  when n is large enough. 
A7 Proof of the Relationship between Distribution Condition and 
Hazard-rate Increasing Property
First of all, the hazard-rate-increasing condition is equivalent to
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( )








The Distribution condition  ( ) ( )[ ] 0// 1 >∫ σµµσ µµσ ddffd   is equivalent to
( ) ( ) ( ) 01 2 ≥+′ ∫ σµµµσσ
µ
σ fdff
The above inequality holds naturally for  ( ){ }0| ≥′ σσ f  . (25) ensures that 
it also holds for  ( ){ }0| <′ σσ f  because 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .11 22 σσσσµµ
µ
σσ µσ fFffdff +−′≥+′ ∫
A8 Proof of Proposition 5
Denote nπ   as the company's expected profit from a SBCC of size n .
















Note that ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 01 :1: =−+∫ + σσσωσωµµ dfnn njnj  and 
( ) ( ) ( )σωσω njnj nn :1:1 −+ +  is single-crossing by Lemma A2 (b). Apply Lemma 
A1(a), a strictly increasing ( )σH  is sufficient for  01 >−+ nn ππ . Similar to the 
proof of Proposition 4, we can show that  01 >−+ nn ππ   also holds for sufficiently 
large n .
The following obtains an upper bound for the company's profit.
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( ) ( )( ) ( )

















































This holds for any distribution, any prize structure, and any n.  
A9 Proof of Proposition 6
Let  ( )µFu =  and  =s ( )σF ,  ( )ut1   can be re-written as,


























( ) ( ) ( )( )
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Because (26) ensures ( ) ( )utut 21 >  for every percentile u , the profit of  1C
will be larger than that of  2C . In fact, it will be so as long as the company’s 
profit is an increasing function of usage.
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A10 Proof of Corollary 1 
We consider  1C   and an equivalence of  2C  , i.e. a contest with the 
performance  ( )tX ,µ   but skill distribution  ( )⋅G  , where  ( )⋅G   is defined by  
( ) ( )( )uFuG 11 −− = φ  . According to proposition 6, a sufficient condition for  
21 ππ >   is ( )( ) µµσµσφ
µφ
σ










∆σσ . Let  ,0→∆σ   we obtain an alternative sufficient 
condition for  21 ππ > , i.e. ( ) ( ) 0<−′ σφσσφ . This condition holds if MRS in  1C
is higher because
( )






A11 Proof of Proposition 7
Let ( )µet  denote the new equilibrium consumption. We can derive ( )µet
in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1 except that the boundary 
condition becomes ( ) 0=ex µ  .





















where eµ  is determined by the condition 
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00, σδµ . (28)
The company’s total profit is
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]






Substitute (27) and (28) in the above expression and focus on the Winner-
Take-All prize structure, we can get
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )











Take first order derivative with respect to eµ , apply ( ) ( ) 11:1 −−− = neenn FF µµ , 
and collect items,














The sign of the derivative is determined by the term in square brackets. 
Denote this term as ( )eA µ . Note that at ( ) 1
1
−−= nA µ  and 








A 1 . If ( ) 0>µA , then there must be an interior point *eµ
such that the total profit reaches its maximum. Thus a sufficient condition for the 
company to charge a positive entry fee is
























A necessary condition for optimal entry fee is that *eµ  solves













Note also that if ( )θ−pp /  is high enough such that ( )µA  is negative 
throughout the support, the company should optimally charge no entry fee.
A12 Proof of Proposition 9
Notice that with reservation utility,









By (18), we can easily show that ( ) ( )σωσω ''1 k−  is single-crossing. 
Therefore as 0µ  increases but does pass the crossing point, kεε −1  only becomes 
more positive. Obviously, if 0µ  passes the crossing point, kεε −1  can only be 
positive. Combining the above two observations, we conclude that the conditions 
we obtained in A5 and A6 are still valid in this case.
A13 Proof of Proposition 10
Assume the prize structure  ( )121 ,...., −nδδδ   is optimal. Assume 0>kδ , by 
optimality, 
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Otherwise, a prize structure ( )121 ,...,,...,,...,, −∆+∆− njk δδδδδ  can deliver 
higher expected utility and therefore attract users (note ( )µω j  is increasing in µ ). 
So it must be ( ) ( ) jjk any for ,00 µωµω ≥ . Thus we conclude that the optimal prize 
structure allocates positive prize sum to the prize differential only if it’s on the 
envelope of ( )µω j ’s. 
Assume ( )µFu = , we can rewrite ( )µω j  in terms of percentile as









−== ∫ 1!1! !11 1011:ω . 
From the above we can see that ( )ujω  is independent of ( )⋅F . Because for 
any distribution, u  is uniformly distributed, we conclude that the shape of ( )ujω
and ( )uω  is invariant to the underlying distribution ( )⋅F . This implies that the 
optimal number of prizes is invariant to the underlying distribution. 
By Lemma A2 (a), ( ) ( ) jiuu ji <− ,ωω  is single-crossing. Furthermore, we 
can also see from the proof of Lemma A2 that the crossing point decreases in j . 
Combining with the fact that ( )ujω  monotonically increases in u , we can infer 
that ( )uω  monotonically increases and is connected from low to high by 
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